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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARK JAMES REDFORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12480 
The defendant appeals his conviction for the crime 
of murder in the first degree. He was convicted in the 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, in and for 
Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable James P. 
McCune, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the 
first degree and he was sentenced to death. 
the phone and asked her if she would like to go along 
(T. 1,640). Redford agreed to meet her at 8:00 p.m., Oc-
tober 10, 1969 (T. 1,560). Michael Branagan and Redford 
then agreed to meet in Grant's Lounge, a bar located in 
Spanish Fork, Utah, at 7: 00 p.m. on October 10, 1969 (T. 
1,695). However, Redford failed to keep his appointment 
(T. 1,695). 
Redford testified that Mike Branagan left the Stocker 
1 Club at approximately 6: 00 and that he left between 6: 30 
to 6: 45 (T. 1,694). Prior to leaving Redford bought a six 
pack of beer (T. 1,694). 
Redford, in accounting for the night's activities, gave 
the following unsubstantiated and contradicted testi-
mony. Redford stated that he drove to Provo to buy a 
I ring at Zales Jewelers. However, finding it closed, pro-
I ceeded to Harold's Tap Room and Lounge, located on ~ Center Street in Provo (T. 1,642, 1,750). He parked 
around the rear of the building (T. 1,753); the parking 
lot was covered with gravel (T. 1,753). At the lounge 
Redford testified that he played pool with casual ac-
quaintances including one Tony Jensen (T. 1,642). Red-
ford testified they played for twenty minutes and then 
he and Tony Jensen went to Regal's Bowling Lane. Red-
; 
1 ford testified that he and Tony had an argument over 
money which culminated in Jensen throwing a cue ball 
at Redford, hitting him in the eye (T. 1,643). After an 
alleged fight in the back of the Regal Bowling Lanes, 
Redford testified that he got in his car which was parked 
in a paved area, and went to Ream's Bargain Center 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ti'. 
The State submits that the judgment of the lower (' 
court should be affirmed. tc 
tt 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 81 
On Friday, October 10, 1969, Clark James Redford l, 
(' 
who resided at the home of his mother located at 1225 
East Center Street, Springville, Utah (T. 190, 1,483) was 
awakened by his mother at approximately 6: 30 in the C 
morning and he then drove to Pleasant Grove in a 1955 le 
Mercury, where he then traveled to Salt Lake City with p: 
other workers (T. 1,488, 1,633). He returned home from 
his work with Fugal Construction Company early, at ap-
t! 
proximately 1: 30 in the afternoon that same day. The 
job was delayed because of the weather (T. 1,489, 1,635). • ~ 
'n 
He removed his high topped cowboy boots and pants, and I 
I Cl 
changed into fresh clothes which included wing tipped C 
dress shoes, sweater and a top coat (T. 1,635). Redford 
then went to the Sage Inn in Springville where his mother le 
worked and there he drank a cup of coffee (T. 1,637). He ~ 
then drove to the Stocker Club which is approximately q 
one and one-half miles from Provo going towards Spring- fc 
ville (T. 1,637). h 
At the Stocker Club, Redford played pool with his 1 fc 
friends until approximately 6: 30 p.m. (T. 1,638). During n 
this time his friend Michael Branagan came in and stated a 
that he and his girl friend Bobbie (Barbara) were going a 
to Ely to get married and invited Redford to come along 
(T. 1,639). Redford agreed and called Kathy Palmer on 
4 
where he purchased some western clothing (T. 1,645). 
He then stated he took Highway 50 and 6 into Spring. 
ville and talked to his mother at the Sage Inn (T. 1,646). 
The record reveals that as part of the investigation 
following the crime that there was no such individual as 
Tony Jensen. Records and sources were checked at the 
vocational school (T. 1,766), taverns, (T. 1,766), and 
Brigham Young University (T. 1,767). A subpoena was 
not able to be served in Utah County (T. 1,767). There 
was no record of any fight at Harold's Tap Room at the 
lounge as testified by the proprietor, Harold L. Thatcher 
(T. 1,001-1,004). Nor was there any evidence of a fight 
at the Regal Bowling Lanes (T. 1,302-1,309). Redford 
was not able to produce a receipt nor was there any evi· 
dence in the record that Redford had purchased western 
clothing at Ream's Bargain Center as he so testified. 
Ann Levanger, one of four children and the daughter 
of Reed and Elva Levanger who resided in Spanish Fork, 
was nineteen years old (T. 499), She shared an apart· 
ment in Provo, with Karren Roberts. The morning of 
October 10th, 1969, she went to the home of her parents 
in Spanish Fork (T. 510). She worked at a bank in Span· 
ish Fork and frequently came home for lunch (T. 510) · 
At noon, October 10, she came home for lunch clad in a 
plaid skirt, a yellow-gold turtle neck, long sleeve sweater, 
brown shoes and a brown bag (T. 511). Her father testi· 
fied that she drove a 1965 Chevrolet Chevelle, described 
as medium brown in color, that was having mechanical 
problems (T. 501-2). 
5 
Miss Levanger left Zions' National Bank with Linda 
Chadwick Patterson at 6: 15 p.m. October 10. Miss 
Levanger's automobile was having difficulty (T. 535), and 
finally killed on the freeway at a location of 1 % miles 
from the Spanish Fork turnoff on the way to Provo, Utah 
(T. 526). 
While Miss Levanger was inside her stalled car on 
the freeway, Redford pulled his car off the freeway and 
talked to her. Mr. and Mrs. Pettit, travelers on the free-
way, stated that the car behind was partially in the emer-
gency lane and partly in the right traveling lane so that 
it was difficult to "merge" without coming to a complete 
stop (T. 542). The Doyles, also travelers on the freeway, 
observed Redford leaning over Miss Levanger's car, and 
when they honked Redford looked directly at them and 
smiled at short distance of from 12 to 15 feet (T. 545, 
563). 
Mrs. Perigo and her husband also observed Redford 
at short distance leaning over the Levanger vehicle with 
a big smile on his face and identified him in the court 
room (T. 599, 600). Commissioner Jackson of the High-
way Patrol who was driving down the freeway also ob-
served Redford at 6: 40 and 6.45 October 10, and identi-
fied him in court (T. 632). Ned L. Deuel, a trooper for 
the highway patrol, found the Levanger automobile un-
occupied at approximately 6: 45 p.m. October 11, 1969 
(T. 647). 
On the 26th day of October, 1969, the body of Ann 
6 
Levangei' was discovered laying 20 to 30 feet off a dirt 
road face down, clad in a yellow sweater, with one sleeve 
wrapped around her neck, and an orange plaid skirt (T. 
706). The body was found near an old abandoned house 
which was formerly owned and occupied by Redford's 
grandmother. Redford had played in the house as a little 
boy (T. 1,494) and had visited the house and area with 
his wife's sister on about the 28th day of September, prior 
to the day of the murder (T. 1,399). A piece of the 
sweater Redford was wearing on October 10, 1969, was 
found on a window sill of the house (T. 1,095) . In the 
same general area of the body of Ann Levanger were 
found her purse, shoes, and full cans of Coor's beer. 
Redford did not arrive at the home of Kathleen 
Palmer at 8: 00 p.m. on the evening of October 10. After 
waiting about 20 minutes, Kathleen Palmer went to the 
cafe with Mike Branagan and Barbara Cook (T. 1,561). 
She left the cafe after about 20 or 25 minutes and drove 
around for a few minutes (T. 1,577-1,587). Then she saw 
Redford coming from the east and going west in his 1955 
Mercury (T. 1,588). Evidence revealed that it would 
have taken one hour and six minutes to go from the point 
on the freeway where the Levanger car was abandoned 
to Silver City and then to Goshen, Utah. 
Barbara Cook (Branagan) testified that she and 
Mike followed Redford as he came into Goshen over to 
Barbara Cook's father's house (T. 969). At that time 
Mike went to get Kathleen and Barbara got in Redford's 
car. Barbara testified that there was mud all over the dash 
7 
and floor mat and that Redford's shoes and his hands 
were covered with mud and that Redford had a black 
eye (T. 970). Redford stated he had a black eye because 
he got in a fight over at Harold's Club in Provo (T. 971). 
Barbara also testified that Redford was wearing a burnt 
orange sweater (T. 974). 
Mike Branagan then returned with Kathy Palmer 
and they loaded the luggage in Branagan's car and went 
to the Twin Pines Cafe for a coke (T. 977). They left 
the cafe about 10: 00 for Ely, Nevada. While driving, 
Redford laid in the back seat of the car and between 
Eureka and Delta he just kept saying "Is it snowing 
yet?" (T. 970). Other testimony revealed that Redford 
was acting strangely. Upon arriving in Ely, Nevada, at 
about 2: 00 p.m., they rented a motel and Redford told 
Barbara that he hadn't slept all night (T. 979). Redford's 
wife, Kathy Palmer and Redford testified that he paced 
the floor all night (T. 1,606, 1,660). After the marriage 
ceremony and a short distance outside of Ely, Redford 
threw his shoes out the window. After nearing Silver 
City or the approximate area, the conversation turned 
to the Levanger girl (T. 1,598). At about this time Red-
ford stated "I did it didn't we, Milrn?" (T. 1,598). 
On the 11th of December, Redford's white over blue 
1955 Mercury was picked up by the operator of the 
Springville Garage, Shirley Thorpe (T. 1,142). The pick-
up was made in front of the Redford home, where the 
vehicle was located on the property line and the street 
(T. 1,142). Section 492 of the Springville ordinances pro-
8 
vides that cars left on the public street in an inoperative 
condition can be picked up and seized at any time (T. 
944) . The vehicle had the engine missing as well as the 
front tires. The vehicle was taken to the county garage 
between 5: 30 and 6: 00, where it was not disturbed until 
the 15th day of December, 1969 (T. 1,146, 1,163). After 
the 15th of December the car was searched, and vacuum 
sweepings revealed hair strands which according to expert 
testimony were identical in 15 points to that of the victim, 
Ann Levanger (T. 1,278). 
The trial counsel entered into a stipulation regarding 
the manner in which the vehicle was seized (T. 340-344). 
However, this stipulation was altered (T. 935, 947-955). 
Oral argument was presented to Judge McCune concern-
ing the motion for suppression of evidence from the car. 
The facts are based in part on the uncontradicted testi-
mony of Greg Newton, who owned a service station and 
garage in Mona, Juab County, Utah (T. 1,211) and who 
also worked part time as a deputy sheriff. Mr. Newton, 
before noon, went to the Sage Inn to see Redford's 
mother, who had the authority to sell or give away the 
1955 Mercury (T. 342). Mr. Newton did not identify 
himself to Mrs. Redford, but identified himself three days 
later (T. 1,222). They had a discussion on the first visit 
concerning the purchase of the car and Mr. Newton asked 
Mrs. Redford if she would sell it (T. 1,222). Mrs. Redford 
replied that she would be more than happy to get rid of 
it· all she wanted from it was the tires and the radio (T. 
' 1,223). Mr. Newton had a use for the car for parts in his 
9 
garage business (T. 1,228). Thereafter the car was picked 
up and brought to the county yard. Mr. Newton returned 
the only tires on the car, the two back tires, to Mrs. Red-
ford. There was no radio in the car (T. 951) . 
Three days later, after the car was already in the 
possession of the police, Mr. Newton telephoned Mrs. 
Redford, identifying himself as Bart Holman, an alias 
•.vhich was sometimes used in the service station business 
(T. 1,224). Mr. Newton called in order to obtain the 
title to the car. At that time, the title to the car was in 
the name of M. D. Richmond. Redford signed and de-
livered the title to his mother, Mrs. Redford, in the Utah 
County Jail, and then she delivered it to Mr. Newton at 
the Sage Inn. 
Mrs. Redford knew the car was in the county im-
pound yard at the time title was given to Mr. Newton. 
The title was delivered by Mrs. Redford to Greg Newton 
prior to the time that any search was made on the auto-
mobile (T. 952). The title was then delivered to the sher-
iff by Greg Newton. There was a search warrant dated 
the 17th day of December issued which would have 
covered the car. However, it was not served because the 
car, along with the title, were already in the possession 
of the police (T. 953). 
Counsel for Redford also filed a motion to suppress 
the testimony of Linda I vie, Phyllis Valerie Reed and 
Marie Howard. The motion was argued beginning at T. 
1,021. Phyllis Valerie Reed would have testified that Red-
ford by the use of a gun had sexual intercourse with her 
10 
in the State of Illinois (T. 1,025). Redford was charged 
with robbery and rape and pled guilty to robbery on the 
24th of March, 1966 (T. 1,633). Marie Howard would 
have testified that about 30 days after the disappearance 
of Ann Levanger that Redford attempted to abduct her i 
in an automobile by using a weapon and taking her 
against her will (T. 1,025). The testimony of a third wit-
ness, Linda Ivie, was admitted in trial (T. 1,085). She 
testified that less than 24 hours before the disappearance 
of Ann Levanger the defendant, wearing the same clothes 
and driving the same automobile, by the use of force, at-
tempted to abduct her (T. 1,323). 
Mack Holley, Deputy Sheriff for Utah County, 
Provo, Utah, testified that the first time he had talked 
to Mr. Redford concerning the homicide of Ann Levanger 
was on the 1st day of December, 1969, at 2: 45 p.m. at the 
Utah County Jail in the jailer's room (T. 1,168). Redford 
was in prison pursuant to a charge for forgery (T. 1,168). 
In the course of the interview, Redford forwarded state· 
ments like "Okay, suppose I did it" (T. 1,177) ; "Okay, 
I did it"; "I can't give you a statement to that effect 




THE TESTIMONY OF LINDA IVIE WAS 
ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE IDENTITY 
OF THE ACCUSED AND THE METHOD OF 
HIS OPERATION. 
11 
The State attempted to introduce the testimony of 
three victims of Redford's assaults. The trial court sup-
pressed the testimony of two of the witnesses, but ad-
mitted the testimony of Linda Ivie (T. 1,089). Prior to 
the testimony given by Linda I vie, the court gave a limit-
ing instruction: 
"I think it would be proper for the court to 
state for your information in connection with my 
instruction to you that her testimony will un-
doubtedly concern another offense or an alleged 
unlawful act by the defendant. This is admitted 
by the court only for the purpose of identity of 
the defendant and for a method of operation. As 
we say in the law, modus operandi, or the initial 
M initial 0, which is commonly referred to. Now, 
I'll state that again, that you are to consider the 
testimony only as to the identity of the defendant, 
his presence in the locality and any method of 
operation of action on his part which you may 
consider from the testimony of this witness. In 
any event, you are not to consider this as any 
proof of another offense and simply for the pur-
poses for which the court has stated." (T. 1,317-
18). (Emphasis added.) 
Redford asserts that the trial court erroneously ad-
mitted the testimony of Linda I vie which described an 
assault upon her person by himself on the evening prior 
to Miss Levanger's murder. Redford further asserts that 
despite the limiting instruction, the jury was permitted 
to consider Mrs. Ivie's testimony for whatever purpose 
desired, citing this Court's earlier decision of State v. 
Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P. 2d 738 (1957). 
l~ 
Redford erreonsly asserts that the conviction should be 
reversed because Winget holds that prior sex acts are 
inadmissible unless they involve the complaining witness. 
Where the identity of the defendant is in issue, evi. 
dence of an assault upon another woman is admissible 
to prove the identity of the defendant in a rape-murder 
prosecution. The general rule regarding the admissibility 
of other criminal acts is that such acts are admissible il 
they form an element of the crime or are relevant to show 
the "(1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, ( 4) plan or 
scheme, or (5) the identity of the defendant." Whart-On 
Criminal Law, Sec. 235, 240 (1955). If the evidence has 
a special relevancy to prove the crime for which the de-
fendant stands charged, such evidence will be admissible 
for that purpose; and the fact that the evidence shows 
the commission of another crime will not render the evi· 
dence inadmissible. State v. Dickenson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 
361P.2d 412, 415 (1961). 
In State v. Winget, supra, the defendant was charged 
with the statutory rape of his 8 year old daughter. The 
trial court allowed into evidence testimony that the 17 
year old stepdaughter of the defendant had been raped 
on four separate occasions by the defendant when the 17 
year old girl had been near the age of the prosecutrix. 
Justice Henroid in writing the opinion of the court indi· 
cated that State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P. 250 
(1909) was controlling and that a new trial must be 
granted. The Court also indicated that 167 A. L. R. 588 
(1947) represents the majority view, which position is the 
13 
same as that of the State of Utah. 
Winget is not applicable to the case at bar on the 
following grounds: (1) Winget purported to follow the 
majority view in 167 A. L. R. 588, which stated the rule 
as: 
"Testimony as to the defendants having com-
mitted or having attempted to commit, similar 
offenses with girls other than the prosecutrix has 
been regarded, in the majority of the statutory 
rape cases in which the question has arisen, as to 
be so unrelated to the offense for which the con-
viction was sought as to be inadmissible in evi-
dence." Id. at 588. (Emphasis added.) 
The annotation then cited as one of the cases follow-
ing this position is State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P. 
250 (1909). However, while this may be the general rule 
as to statutory rape, the subject of both Williams and 
Winget, this is not the law as to common law rape. In 
167 A. L. R. 594 under the heading "2. Other offense not 
with same person," subsection (a), offense of rape or 
attempted rape, or sexual intercourse, the general rule is 
stated to be: 
"Evidence of the prior rape of, or assault 
upon, another woman has been held to be ad-
missible for purposes of identification, or of show-
ing the plan, scheme, or bent of mind of the de-
fendant in a prosecution for forcible rape." Id. at 
594. (Emphasis added.) 
Also in Williams, supra, the court quoted from Whar-
ton's Crim. Law 635, " ... [n]or is admissible to prove in-
dependent crimes, even though of the same general char-
-
14 
acter, except when falling strictly within the exceptions 
stated." Id. at 278. (Emphasis added.) 
(2) In Winget the court failed to give limiting in-
structions, but the trial court instructed the jury: 
"You are instructed that if you find and be-
lieve beyond a reasonable doubt that such other 
acts were in fact committed by the defendant, 
such evidence is admissible for the sole purpose of 
showing a system, plan and scheme of the defen-
dant and to prove the lustful and lascivious dispo-
sition of the defendant and as having a tendency 
to render it more probable the acts of sexual in· 
tercourse charged in the information were com-
mitted on or about the date alleged, and for no 
other purpose." State v. Winget, appellant's brief 
8630. 
There is little question that the instruction given in 
Winget was clearly erroneous for prior offenses cannot be 
used to show the lustful disposition of the defendant. As 
explained, the trial court in the present case did give a 
limiting instruction. 
(3) The court stated in Williams, supra: 
" ... The statement that he had committed 
like crimes with other girls in no way tended to 
elucidate or explain the alleged assault upon the 
complaining witness. It was a narrative or recital 
of transactions which were neither directly nor re-
motely connected with the crime under considera-
tion .... " Id. at 277, 278. 
Similarly, in Winget the alleged rape of the 17 year old 
bore no particular relationship to the incident for which 
15 
the defendant was being tried. There was no showing 
that the acts relating to the 17 year old girl were in any 
way related to the rape of the prosecutrix, which was the 
crime for which the defendant was being tried. Identity 
was not in question, nor was there any question of modus 
operandi as there is in the present case. 
( 4) The first incident of rape of the 17 year old 
stepdaughter in Winget took place when she was 8 or 9 
years old, and the last when she was 12. Thus, there was 
a period of 5 years between last incident of rape and 9 
years difference between the first incident of rape and 
the testimony of the stepdaughter at trial when she was 
17 years old. 
In the present case, Linda I vie was assaulted by Red-
ford within twenty-four hours of his act of rape and mur-
der upon Ann Levanger. In view of the short time span, 
the assault on Linda I vie could be considered part of the 
res gestae of the crime. Gephart v. State, 249 S. W. 2d 
612 (Tex. 1952). 
In the case at bar the testimony of Linda Ivie was 
admissible for it was relevant to show both the identity 
of the accused and his method of operation. Linda Ivie 
was married and living in Springville, Utah, and employed 
as a secretary at Brigham Young University, while her 
husband went to school. She was twenty-nine years of 
age and described as an attractive young lady (T. 1,850). 
She went to a Springville laundromat about 9: 00 on Oc-
tober 9, 1969, to wash her clothes and knitted while she 
waited for them to dry (T. 1,320). She noticed a tur-
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quoise and white car go slowly up the street, then the 
car pulled up in front and parked in front of the laundro-
mat. Redford walked from the car into the laundromat 
and talked to her for a minute and then grabbed hold 
of her (T. 1,323). Up to the time he had grabbed her 
Redford spoke in a normal conversational tone (T. 1,323). 
When Mrs. I vie stood up she noticed he had a pocket 
knife in his hand (T. 1,338). Redford told her to put his 
arm around her and walk out to the car (T. 1,324). She 
stated that his car was a '56 or '57 Mercury or Lincoln 
(T. 1,325). As Redford opened the door, Mrs. Ivie broke 
away and hid in some bushes. She identified both the 
color and the style of the sweater Redford was wearing 
as well as the color of his pants and also the fact that 
Redford was wearing a school ring. 
One of the most critical factors in showing the method 
of operation of Redford is the sheer brashness and open-
ness of the two assaults. In the words of defense counsel: 
"Remember the location of this crime in 
Springville, as I recall, 1st South and 1st West, 
one block off the main street in Springville. Clark 
Redford lived in Springville, most of the people in 
Springville, in that area knew him. The Stocker 
Club, in fact is only three or four blocks from here. 
If someone were to commit this type of crime 
would they do it in their own neighborhood? (T. 
1,850, 54). 
In comparing the method of his assault upon Ivie 
with that upon Ann Levanger, Redford was present right 
on the freeway leaning over the side of the victim's auto· 
mobile with at least four witnesses observing him from 
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a distance of ten to fifteen feet. Redford actually turned 
and smiled at the witnesses within minutes of a brutal 
and depraved act. 
In both cases, Redford talked prior to his crimes in 
a seemingly normal conversational manner. In both cases 
Redford did or attempted to perpetrate his crimes with 
the use of an old dilapidated automobile, parked where 
any passerby would notice it. In both cases the victims 
were young and attractive. In the case of Linda I vie, 
Redford used a knife to force her to leave the laundromat 
and get in his automobile. In the case of Ann Levanger, 
her roommate and witness for the defense, Karren Rob-
erts, stated as follows: 
"Q. And during the time that you lived to-
gether and you knew Ann Levanger did you get 
to know her fairly well? 
A. Yes. We were very close. 
Q. How would you describe her as far as her 
character is concerned? 
A. A very lovely person to know, a person 
to get close to, someone that you could confide in. 
She was friendly with people and just a good per-
son. 
* * * 
Q. Knowing Miss Levanger, knowing her 
character and her personality, I will ask you if 
you have an opinion as to whether or not she 
would accept a ride with a strange man? 
A. No. 
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Q. Yes or no, if you have an opinion. 
A. Yes I have an opinion. 
Q. And what is that opinion? 
A. No, unless she was forced" (T. 1,462-3). 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is evident from the defense's own witness that Ann 
Levanger would not have willingly entered that vehicle 
of Redford unless she was forced against her will. The 
evidence of the Ivie assault is admissible to detennine 
Redford's method of operation. 
Redford states, "The identity of a perpetrator of the 
offense is the only significantly triable issue" (Appellant's 
brief page 5). The testimony of Linda Ivie also was rele-
vant to reveal the identity of the accused. Redford was 
wearing the same clothes as the day of the murder, driv-
ing the same car and also was wearing a class ring. Mrs. 
I vie also described Redford's looks, including color of his 
hair, etc. There is little question that her testimony had 
relevance in describing and identifying the accused, Clark 
James Redford. 
In State v. McHenry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P. 2d 711 
(1958), this Court stated: 
". . . It is true evidence of a prior crime is as 
a general rule not admissible in the prosecut~on 
of an accused for a charged offense. An exception 
to this rule exists in instances when such evidence 
tends to aid of the identification of the defendant 
presently charged." Id. at 291. 
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See also, State v. Baran, 25 U. 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728 
(1970). 
In People v. Clark, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106, 6 Cal. App. 3d 
658 ( 1970) , which has a fact situation similar to the case 
at bar, the court held that evidence in a prosecution for 
murder as to prior sex offenses committed by a defendant 
which were sufficiently similar to each other and the 
crime for which the defendant was being tried, were ad-
missible to prove a common scheme, plan or modus oper-
andi and was admissible to establish the defendant's 
identity. See also Mims v. State, 241 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 
App. 1970) and Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 
1959). In People v. Lindsay, 38 Cal. Rptr. 755, 227 Cal. 
App. 2d 482 (1964) the Court held that the essential 
question for determination in each instance is whether: 
". . . [ t] here is either a direct or circumstantial 
connection between the similar offense and the 
charged offense to support the inference that if 
the defendant committed the similar offense, he 
probably committed the act charged. That de-
termination requires that the facts pertaining to 
the other offense show a general pattern, scheme 
or plan. . . . Whether the applicable test is satis-
fied is primarily a question for the trial court." 
Id. at 769. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the facts and applicable case law that 
the testimony of Linda I vie was admissible for the limited 




THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY DID NOT EX-
CEED THE PERMISSIBLE BOUNDS OF 
CROSS-EXAMINATION WHEN CROSS-EX-
AMINING REDFORD. 
The judge is the person who has the final responsi-
bility for conducting the trial. He should be allowed 
considerable latitude of discretion with the mechanics of 
procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-5 (1953), provides 
in part that if a defendant offers himself as a witness he 
may be cross-examined by the counsel for the state the 
same as any other witness. 
As stated in 3 Wharton Criminal Evidence, § 887 
(1955): 
"Considerable or great latitude should be al-
lowed in the cross-examination of the defendant 
even though his testimony is self incriminating. 
Some courts state that an even wider or greater 
latitude in the cross-examination of the accused 
should be allowed than is ordinarily the case .... 
As an application of the rule applicable to wit-
nesses, generally the form, extent, and latitude of 
the cross-examination of an accused who voluntar· 
ily offers himself as a V'litness are matters for the 
discretion of the trial court. . . . The discretion 
will not be interfered with by the reviewing court 
unless there is a clear abuse thereof." 
In Hopper v. State, 302 P. 2d 162 (Okl. 1956), thE 
defendant appealed his conviction for sodomy and ob 
jected to the scope of cross-examination. The court withir 
the opinion echoed the same rule of law as phrased ir 
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Wharton by stating: 
" ... Moreover, where a defendant, in a criminal 
case takes the stand in his own behalf, he may be 
cross-examined to the same extent as any other 
witness, and the extent of the examination is a 
matter within the trial court's sound discretion, 
Murphy v. State, 72 Old. Cr. 1, 112 P. 2d 438 and 
will not be interfered with on appeal unless fra-
grantly abused." Id. at 166. 
In the present case Redford voluntarily took the wit-
ness stand and in the face of his prior out of court state-
ment, testimony of eye witnesses and circumstantial evi-
dence relating to the crime, flatly denied that he had even 
seen Ann Levanger. It is a well known general rule of 
law that the accused may be cross-examined for the pur-
pose of impeachment by questions which tend to impeach 
his credibility, by inquiry as to prior contradictory state-
ment, as to matters relating to memory, motives, history, 
past conduct and other matters affecting his credibility. 
Dixon v. State, 228 Ark. 430, 307 S. W. 2d 792 (1957), 
State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 149 A. 2d 698 (1959). 
After the defense counsel objected to the District 
Attorney's line of questioning the court stated: 
"The court feels, however that perhaps the 
way some of the questions were framed by Mr. 
Burns, just before the objection are too much con-
jecture and insinuations or intimations and not 
perhaps the best way, proper way of asking the 
defendant to admit or deny certain facts which 
have been presented in evidence and referred to 
in this case." 
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The District Attorney rightfully questioned Redford 
about exhibits that were in evidence and attempted to 
impeach his testimony. Redford in stating that the ques-
tions asked by Mr. Burns were prejudicial, ignores the 
bulk of a lengthy cross-examination. If anything Red-
ford's testimony during cross-examination was helpful 
rather than prejudicial for he certainly did not deny his 
alibi during the examination. 
Redford relies on two cases for his theory that the 
cross-examination was prejudicial. McDonald v. Price, 
181 P. 2d 115 (Cal. 1947) arose out of an action for wrong-
ful death. In that case, the plaintiff's sole assignment 
of error related to the prejudicial misconduct of defen· 
dant's counsel in asking a series of questions over plain-
tiff's objections with respect to criminal activities of the 
decedent some years prior to his death. Leeth v. State, 
230 P. 2d 942, (Okla. 1951), concerned the attempted ad· 
mission of a wire recording, which then prompted the 
remarks of the court. Neither case is applicable to the 
facts of the case at bar. 
Let us not forget that Redford was being tried for 
the most heinous of all crimes, rape and murder. As stated 
in Wingate v. State, 232 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App. 1970): 
" ... Certainly the ideal climate for the con· 
duct of a criminal trial is one of fair and cool im· 
partiality, Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 196 So. 
596 (1940). However, the emotional weakne~ses 
unto which men are prone have been recogmzed 
by the common law and provision has beei:i made 
for these human fallibilities which may mtrude 
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upon the most experienced prosecuting attorneys." 
Id. at 45. 
Assuming arguendo that the manner of cross-exam-
ination was prejudicial to the defendant, it must still be 
considered harmless error, Chapman v. California, 306 
U. S. 18 (1967). Many jurisdictions have enunciated the 
principle that the concept of a "fair trial" must not be 
confused with that of a perfect trial. An accused has 
constitutional right to a "fair trial" but not necessarily 
to that seldom experienced rarity of a perfect trial. State 
v. Smith, 119 W. Va. 347, 193 S. E. 573, 574 (1964). In 
light of the overwhelming amount of evidence that was 
brought forward by the State, the cross-examination of 
Redford was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and 
would not affect the outcome of the trial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO GRANT REDFORD'S MOTION TO SUP-
PRESS THE EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS 
A RES ULT OF THE SEARCH OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE. 
This case represents a rather unusual fact situation. 
At the time the car was given to Greg Newton, a garage 
owner and part time employee of the county sheriff's 
office, by Redford's mother, Redford was incarcerated in 
the Utah State Prison, pursuant to a recent conviction 
for forgery (T. 1,632) and a prior conviction in 1966 for 
robbery for which conviction he was on parole (T. 1,635). 
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Mrs. Rc:dford had the authority to sell or give away the 
vehicle (T. 342). The car was out in the front of her 
house partially in the street in a dilapidated condition 
without an engine with the hood up and without tires ; 
or hubs on the front wheels. Mr. Newton went to the 
Sage Inn, where Redford's mother was working, and 
without telling her his name asked if she would like to 
sell the car. She replied that she would be more than 
happy to get rid of it and only requested that Mr. Newton 
give her the tires and the radio out of the car. The car 
was later towed away that same day and three days later 
Mr. Newton using the name of Bart Holman, an alias he 
used in the garage business, called Mrs. Redford request· 
ing the title. She went to the prison, had Redford sign it, 
and knowing the car was in the county impound yard, 
Mrs. Redford delivered the title to Mr. Newton. There· 
after, the car was searched. The search revealed five 
strands of hair which were later identified as being identi· 
cal to the type of hair of Ann Levanger. 
Redford urges that the auto was not validly seized 
and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Fourth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against ~n· 
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be v10· 
lated and no warrants shall issue, but upon prob· 
able ~ause supported by oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the persons or things to be seized." (Empha· 
sis added.) 
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Although the language of the Amendment is clear 
that it pro1'jbits only unreasonable searches and seizures 
' 
the Supreme Court of the United States, through its con-
struction of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth, has evolved a doctrine in 
respect to automobile searches which is most recently 
expressed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022 
(1971). There are various exceptions to Coolidge, such 
as consent and standing, and the present case falls within 
those exceptions. 
In the recent case of United States v. Wilmoth, 325 
F. Supp. 1397 (1971), where agents were acting in an un-
dercover capacity and the defendant relinquished posses-
sion of a double-barreled shot gun and rifle and a quan-
tity of ammunition to agents voluntarily, not realizing 
they were federal agents, the court held there was no 
reason to suppress that evidence. This principle has long 
been recognized in cases wherein narcotics agents misrep-
resent their identity in order to purchase narcotics from 
a willing seller. Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 
(1966). However, in the present case, Mr. Newton did 
not misrepresent himself but simply asked if he could buy 
the car and thereafter upon agreement obtained posses-
sion of the automobile. 
The State submits that the case of State v. Mon-
tayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958 (1966) is controlling 
under the present factual situation. In Montayne the 
defendant was found guilty of the crimes of robbery and 
grand larceny, and argued on appeal that the trial court 
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erred in failing to suppress certain evidence. The defen. 
dant was driving a rental car and after a police officer 
who stopped the vehicle found the car was far overdue I 
I I 
arrested the defendant for car theft. After arresting the : 
defendant the officer searched the vehicle and found in-
criminating evidence used in the course of robbery and 
grand larceny charges. 
The court then stated: 
' 
"Three questions arise with regard to that 1 
case: (1) was the search incident to a lawful 
arrest? (2) if not did the appellant have standing 
to object to the unlawful search and seizure, (3) 
if not incident to unlawful arrest and if the appel-
lant had 'standing' to object, was the evidence 
prejudicial or merely harmless error?" Id. at 41. 
This Court then stated that it did not need to consider 
question (1) and (3) because the answer to (2) was 
dispositive of the case. This Court then explained that 
in order for the appellant to have standing the sole pre· 
requisite is that he claim a proprietary interest in the 
search or seized property. Simpson v. United States, 346 
F. 2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). 
The court distinguished Simpson m M ontayne by 
stating: 
" ... [t]he Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
gave such standing to a defendant because h.e 
claimed a possessory interest in the car and hzs I 
lack of ownership was not established until after 
the search. (Emphasis ours.) Here lack of owner· 
ship was established with reasonable certainty 
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before the search, thus distinguishing it from the 
Simpson case." Id. at 41. 
Here also Redford does not have standing to chal-
lenge the admission of evidence obtained from the car. 
Title to the car was in the name of M. D. Richards. The 
search was not conducted until after Greg Newton was 
the owner and had title to the automobile. The fact that 
Newton was working part time for the sheriff's office or 
he knew the sheriff's office had use of the car is not rele-
vant for title and possession of the car were obtained as 
a private individual. (See Herbert v. State, 10 Md. App. 
279, 269 A. 2d 430 (1970) .) Utah Code Ann § 41-2-1 (e) 
(1967) provides: 
" ... A person who holds the legal title of a 
vehicle or in the event a vehicle is the subject of 
an agreement for a conditional sale . . . shall be 
deemed the owner for the purpose of this act." 
There is also question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment, designed to protect a person's right to privacy, 
should apply to a semi-abandoned vehicle without an 
engine, sitting in the street, that was given away in re-
turn for the tires on the back hubs. This Court in Mon-
tayne, stated: "Courts are diligent in preventing the low-
ering of barriers which protect the individual liberties of 
our citizens, but in the exercise of this diligence the per-
sonal and property rights of members of the public should 
not be completely overlooked for the benefit of those who 
have no regard for either." Id. at 42. 
In United States v. Powers, 439 F. 2d 373 (1971), the 
--
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issue concerned the legality of a search for identification 
numbers. The Court held the two most significant fac. 
tors were (1) the mobility of the automobile and (2) the 
"expectation of privacy" that a person may reasonably 
claim for those parts of the vehicle where identification 
numbers are posted. " ... Thus, warrantless searches of 
the trunk, the glove compartment, the console or similar 
areas have been approved, only within strict limitations 
... " Id. at 375. The extent of Redford's interest in his 
privacy in an automobile without an engine, without the 
tires and sitting partially in a public street while Redford 
was incarcerated could not be great, especially in light 
of the fact that Mrs. Redford was more than happy to 
get rid of the car. 
According to the record (T. 944) a Springville or· 
dinance provides that cars left on the public street in an 
inoperative condition can be picked up and seized at any 
time. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 
391 U. S. 216 (1968) the Court noted that although the 
police had taken an automobile and its occupant to a jail 
- there was no indication that the police had purported 
to impound or hold the automobile, or that they weri 
authorized by any state law to do so, or that their seard 
of the automobile was intended to implement the purpos1 
of such custody. See, Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 51 
(1967). In the present case it appears that the poliet 
could have been justified in seizing on the grounds of th1 
city ordinance for the automobile was at least partiallJ 
in the street. 
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Furthermore, the argument may not be made that 
the officers could have obtained a search warrant and did 
not do so. In the first place the officers did not need a 
search warrant. They had possession of the car and also 
permission to search the car from Greg Newton who was 
given title to the car. Secondly, in United States v. 
Dgembiewski, 437 F. 2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1971), the Court 
stated: 
". . . It is no answer to say that the police 
could have obtained a search warrant, for '[t)he 
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to 
procure a search warrant but whether the search 
was reasonable'." United States v. Rabinowitz, 399 
U. S. 56, 66 [70 S. Ct. 430, 435, 94 L. Ed. 653)." 
Id. at 1215. 
Redford relies primarily on Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921), in stating that the evidence was 
illegally obtained. In Gouled a business acquaintance of 
the petitioner, acting under orders of federal officers, ob-
tained entry into the petitioner's office by falsely repre-
senting that he intended only to pay a social visit. In 
the petitioner's absence the intruder secretly ransacked 
the office and seized certain private papers of an incrim-
inating nature. The Supreme Court had no difficulty 
concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated 
by the secret and general ransacking. This clearly is not 
similar to the facts of the case at bar. Here Newton went 
to the Sage Inn where Redford's mother was working and 
simply asked if she would like to sell the car. 
The facts and the law are clear that the evidence 
obtained from the car was properly admitted at trial. 
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is punishable with death?" (T. 155). (Emphasis 
added.) 
When asked, Mr. Knotts again replied: 
"A. I'd be the same on that" (T. 156). 
On voir dire, Knotts was questioned by the Court 
as to his beliefs regarding capital punishment and his 
ability to return the death penalty: 
"Q. Mr. Knotts, you have indicated that you 
have some question or reservation as to the death 
penalty. Would your feelings in the matter pre-
vent you from bringing in a verdict imposing the 
death penalty in any event in any case without 
regard to the evidence and the facts? 
A. I'd say yes, because I wouldn't want that 
on my conscience to sentence somebody to a death 
penalty that you're not sure of, regardless. 
Q. That would be your feeling in any case -
A. That would be right. 
Q. - in which you may be a juror? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you understand, or do you feel that a 
person such as yourself who may oppose the death 
penalty just as much as one who may favor it in 
certain cases, that you could make your discre-
tionary judgment and consider the matter on the 
evidence and all of the facts and that you could 
still fulfill your oath as a juror and vote the death 
penalty if you in fact thought it should be? 
A. I'd be opposed to the death penalty, I 
wouldn't want it to be on the jury to give the 
death penalty or hang the jury that wanted to 
give the death penalty, or detain it in any way. 
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POINT IV. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR GLEN KNOTTS 
WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM THE 
JURY PANEL. 
The trial court first asked each of the 32 jurors in· 
dividually that since the laws of the State of Utah pro. 
vide that "Every person guilty or found guilty shall suffer 
death, or upon the recommendation of the jury may be 
imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life" (T. 
152), whether the punishment affixed by law is too severe 
for the offense of murder in the first degree. When asked 
Mr. Knotts replied: 
"A. No, I don't go for the death penalty" (T. 
153). 
The Court then asked the entire body of jury men. 
"Q. As the Court has explained to the jury, 
this offense is punishable by death under the law 
of the State of Utah, do any of you entertain a 
conscientious opinion which would preclude you 
from finding the defendant guilty in view of the 
fact that the penalty may be death? Mr. Burras· 
ton and Mr. Knotts have expressed such a reser· 
vation or opinion. The court feels that it is his 
duty to advise all members of the jury panel that 
being opposed to the death penalty or just merely 
having conscientious scruples against the death 
penalty is not sufficient to disqualify you for jury 
service. . . . The court will ask each of you for the 
record do you have a conscientious opinion which 
would preclude you from finding the defendant 
guilty based upon the fact that the offense charged 
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Q. Well, the Court will ask you this, Mr. 
Knotts, and if you don't understand it be sure to 
bring it to the court's attention. Is it yom frame 
of mind at this time, then, that you could not and 
that you would not under any circumstances re-
gardless of what the evidence might be, return a 
verdict recommending the death penalty? 
A. No, I couldn't do it. 
Q. That is your frame of mind, then -
A. That's right" (T. 158-60). 
In Witherspoon v. United States, 391 U. S. 510 
(1968), the defendant had been convicted of murder in 
Illinois. At the time of his trial, an Illinois statute pro-
vided: 
"In trials for murder it shall be a cause for chal· 
lenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, 
state that he has conscientious scruples against 
capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the 
same." (Emphasis added.) 391 U. S. at 512. 
Pursuant to this statute, the prosecution challenged 
nearly half of the prospective jurors without inquiring as 
to whether or not their admitted bias against capital pun· 
ishment would influence their impartiality on the guilt-
innocence issue. The jury in Illinois, like in Utah, makes 
findings on both the guilt-innocence and penalty issues. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of guilty 
but reversed the imposition of the death sentence on the 
grounds that: 
" ... in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be 
imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that irn· 
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partiality to which the petitioner was entitled un-
der the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment." 391 
U.S. at 516. 
The Court ruled that a death-qualified jury stacks 
the deck against the accused on the penalty issue. On the 
other hand, the Court did not address itself to the issue 
of whether or not death-qualified jurors could be excused 
if their biasness would prohibit an impartial finding on 
the guilt-innocence issue. 
Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias may 
be taken: 
"If the offense charged is punishable with death, 
the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as 
preclude (the juror's) finding the defendant guilty, 
in which case he must neither be permitted nor 
compelled to serve as a juror." (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19 (9) (1953). 
This is substantially different than the Illinois stat-
ute cited above. Under Utah law, mere conscientious 
scruples is not enough to challenge a prospective juror. 
The bias must be sufficiently strong so as to "preclude 
(the juror's) finding the defendant guilty." This stan-
dard appears to be in harmony with Witherspoon, al-
though this specific issue was not discussed in that case 
as mentioned above. 
However, the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled pre-
cisely on this point in Howard v. State, 446 P. 2d 163 
(Nev. 1968). When this case was tried, Nevada had an 
exclusion statute identical to the Utah statute cited 
above. 
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The defendant, on appeal, alleged error in challeng. 
ing prospective jurors with scruples in light of the Wither. 1 
spoon, case. The Court upheld the defendants' convic.: 
tion and resolved the point on appeal by saying: 
1 
" ... the rationale of Witherspoon is inapposite to 
the Nevada statute since the statutory purpose is 
to disqualify jurors whose opinions against the 
death penalty would preclude their finding the 
defendant guilty. The Illinois statute considered 
in Witherspoon did not involve the right to chal-
lenge for cause those prospective jurors who stated 
that their reservations about capital punishment 
would prevent them from making an impartial de· 
cision as to the defendant's guilt." 466 P. 2d at 
165. 
The Nevada Court affirmed this position in Bornes 
v. State, 450 P. 2d 150 (Nev. 1969). I 
This court in the case of State v. Kelbach, 23 Ut.ah 
2d 331, 461 P. 2d 297 (1969), decided the same exact 
issue before the court now. The court held that the ques-
tion asked by the trial judge in his voir dire examination: 
"* * * Since this offense is punishable by 
death, if these men should be convicted of the 
crime of first degree murder, do any of you jurors 
entertain such conscientious opinions about the 
death penalty as would preclude you[r] finding 
a defendant guilty irrespective of how strong the 
evidence may be concerning guilty? * * *" 461 
P. 2d at 303. 
complied with the statutory provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. 77-30-19 (9) (1953). This court further added that 
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the statute complies with the second exclusion of footnote 
21 of Witherspoon, supra, wherein the court stated: 
"* * * We repeat, however, that nothing we 
say today bears upon the power of a State to 
execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury 
from which the only veniremen who were in fact 
excluded for cause were those who made it un-
mistakably clear (1) that they would automatic-
ally vote against the imposition of capital punish-
ment without regard to any evidence that might 
be developed at the trial of the case before them, 
or (2) that their attitude toward the death pen-
alty would prevent them from making an impartial 
decision as the defendant's guilt. * * *" 461 
P. 2d at 303. 
It is clear from the language of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-30-19 (9) (1953), if the juror entertains conscientious 
objections which would preclude finding the defendant 
guilty, the juror must neither be permitted nor compelled 
to serve. In view of Mr. Knotts' replies, the court could 
not permit him to serve. Furthermore, the transcript is 
clear that Mr. Knotts was excluded because he could not 
be impartial on the guilt-innocence issue and not because 
he was opposed to capital punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, the testimony of Linda Ivie was 
admissible to show the identity of the accused and also 
his method of operation. Furthermore, the search of Red-
ford's car was not conducted until after both possession 
and title to the car had been lawfully transferred. There 
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is similarly no merit to Redford's additional contentions 
that Mr. Burns exceeded the bounds of cross-examination 
or that Mr. Knotts was improperly excluded as a juror, 
In light of the overwhelming amount of evidence which 
the State brought forth at trial, any error must be deemed 
harmless error. Wherefore, the State respectfully prays 
that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
